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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Paul S. Grewal, Magistrate Judge

United States of America, ) No. CR11-0471 DLJ

Plaintiff, vs.

Dennis Collins, et al.

Defendant.

San Jose, California Friday, February 17, 2012

## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE OFFICIAL ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING

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    Friday, February 17, 2012
                                                       10:05 a.m.
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              THE CLERK: Your Honor, we are calling United States
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    versus Dennis Collins, et al. Case Number CR11-471.
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              Counsel, please state your appearances.
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              MR. PARRELLA: For the Government, Matt Parrella and
    Hanley Chew. Good morning, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Good morning, gentlemen.
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              MR. LEEMING: And for Mr. Collins, who is appearing
    by telephone, Your Honor, Peter Leeming. Good morning.
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              THE COURT: Good morning.
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              MR. COHEN: Good morning, Your Honor. Stanley Cohen
    on behalf of Mercedes Haefer, who has waived. And I'm also
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    standing in this morning on behalf of Alexis Briggs, who is
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    actually in Minnesota and her client Christopher Vo, who's
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    waived as well.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Cohen, good morning, sir.
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              MR. COHEN: Good morning.
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              MR. VIZZI: Good morning, Your Honor. Ean Vizzi on
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    behalf of Donald Husband whose appearance is waived.
              THE COURT: Good morning.
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              MR. NOLAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Tom Nolan on
    behalf of Mr. Covelli, who's present, Joshua Covelli.
23
    also appearing specially for Mr. Thompson, who's at a
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    preliminary hearing on a homicide case previously set, and I'm
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    appearing for Mr. Valenzuela on that matter.
              THE COURT: Mr. Nolan, good morning, sir.
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              MR. WHELAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Michael
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    Whelan for Mr. Cooper, whose presence has previously been
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    waived. Mr. Cooper is available by phone if we need him.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MR. WHELAN: Good morning.
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              THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Whelan.
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              MR. FIGUEROA: Good morning. Omar Figueroa for
    Vincent Charles Kershaw whose presence has also been waived.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Figueroa, good morning, sir.
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              MS. MEIERHENRY: Good morning, Your Honor. Dena
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    Meierhenry on behalf of Drew Alan Phillips whose presence has
    been waived.
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              THE COURT: Good morning as well.
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              MR. ARCHER: Good morning, Your Honor. Graham
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    Archer for Ethan Haindl Miles whose presence has been waived.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Archer, good morning, sir.
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              MR. ARCHER: Good morning.
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              MR. HAMASAKI: Good morning, Your Honor. John
    Hamasaki on behalf of Keith Wilson Downey whose appearance has
21
22
    also been waived.
              THE COURT: Mr. Hamasaki, good morning.
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              MR. LUECK: Good morning, Your Honor. John Lueck on
25
    behalf of Jeffrey Puglisi whose appearance has been waived.
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THE COURT: Mr. Lueck, good morning, sir. 1 MS. SPENCER: Good morning, Your Honor. Michelle 2 3 Spencer appearing on behalf of Daniel Sullivan whose appearance has been waived. 4 5 THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Spencer. 6 MR. CAREY: Good morning, Your Honor. Rob Carey. 7 I'm appearing on behalf of James Murphy whose presence has 8 been waived. 9 THE COURT: Mr. Carey, good morning, sir. MR. CARRANZA: Good morning, Your Honor. Jaime 10 Carranza with U.S. Pretrial Services. 11 12 MS. FARAHMAND: Good morning, Your Honor. Gelareh Farahmand with Pretrial Services. 13 THE COURT: All right. Good morning each of you as 14 15 well. All right. Is there anyone whose appearance has not been made before we turn to the matters at hand? If not, why 16 don't you all take a seat. We've got a lot to cover this 17 18 morning. I appreciate your filings and have done my best to 19 work through the matrix that you've created for me in terms of 20 joinder and cross-joinder. 21 22 Without taking up the entire morning reciting exactly my understanding of all the motions that have been 23 filed and all the joinders that have been filed as well, I 24 25 will simply say that I would like to begin with the motion to

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    compel.
              I believe it was filed by Ms. Valenzuela, docket
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          I believe it's the most challenging of the issues we
    need to cover, so I'd like to begin with that.
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              Mr. Nolan, it appears you're going to speak first?
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              MR. NOLAN: Yeah. I'm going to have to speak for
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    Mr. Thompson and also for Mr. Covelli, since we joined in that
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    matter.
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              THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Nolan,
    I -- I believe I understand the -- the parties' positions from
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    the papers, but I'd like to have you explain to me your view
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    of how this return issue relates to the issue of segregation,
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    because as I see it there are really two separate big
    questions here.
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              The first is whether the Defendants are entitled to
15
    a return of the hardware, either in light of a violation of
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    the conditions upon which the seizure of that hardware was
17
    authorized, or under the general requirements of Rule 41.
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              So why don't you proceed and --
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              MR. NOLAN: Well, let me ask if -- if there's any
20
    counsel who wants to address that issue other than myself?
21
22
              I -- I agree with the Court. It's two separate
23
    issues.
             And -- and it appears to me that the -- that if
    you're going to conduct a search and take a medium that
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25
    contains a great deal of information -- by the way, it's the -
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    - the information, rather than -- if you're looking at -- at -
    - at the physical item, they say they're going to forfeit it.
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              Well, that's separate from the information that's
    contained thereon. I mean, if you were going to give them a
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    hard drive, for example, and say "Copy everything on to my
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6
    hard drive," then presumably you're entitled to that, and then
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    you're entitled to make motions to suppress or other motions
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    that might pertain to the -- the seizure that you're not
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    allowed to use, etcetera, whether -- on the scope issue.
              So you know, I -- I -- I think that we're going to -
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    - we're going to return into more of these kinds of problems,
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    and the question is what burden does the Defendant have to
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    receive back versus what -- what requirement the Government
    has to return.
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              You know, it's -- it seems to me that -- that they
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    know they're not entitled to these documents because they
    seize them because it would be -- you know, it would be
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    impossible, in their mind, to sit there and separate it out at
    the scene, but then they have a duty, and it doesn't appear as
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    if they want to fulfill that duty to take -- to do that step.
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    In other words --
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              THE COURT: It's a duty that's explicitly set out in
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    attachment C, to at least certain --
              MR. NOLAN: That's right.
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25
              THE COURT:
                         -- warrants, correct?
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MR. NOLAN: Absolutely. Absolutely. Yeah. And a - and a recognition that, you know, we don't want -- we don't
want law enforcement to have to sit there in the house with
the -- with the computer for a period of a week to go through
it. We're allowing them to take it out.

But there's a price for that, and the price is they have to do what they're supposed to do, which is make sure they only seize those things that the warrant in effect tells them they can seize.

THE COURT: And I -- I take it your view is that Judge Lloyd, among others, relied upon that representation and commitment in authorizing the seizure?

MR. NOLAN: Absolutely. Absolutely. And -- and, you know, I think as a practical matter, what happens is is that, you know, it's hard to get law enforcement with such a large quantity of information to understand that they can't work on their other matters.

They have a duty to the Defendants at that point to

-- to do this, and it -- and it's something that may not be

something that they can mark in their little book that it was
helpful in the investigation. It's a requirement they have to
do.

And I think that -- I think that -- that it's acknowledged by the search warrant. It's acknowledged that the -- the law that -- you know, that -- that we cited. And

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the Government didn't cite anything contrary, other than to
say "Well, we're going to try to forfeit these -- these
items."
          Again, even if they forfeited -- even if they
forfeited the -- the -- the -- the actual computer, they're
still required to give me my information that -- that -- that
I'm entitled to. So I see that as a duty that they have.
          And -- and I don't see any -- they can't get around
it. Well, I don't know how they can get around that
particular duty. Maybe they can get around it by saying
"Okay, we'll give you everything back. You know, we'll give
you absolutely everything back." Well, then we have to make
motions for bills of particulars in terms of what's relevant.
          But for -- I say fortunately -- maybe unfortunate
for their argument -- it gets to the second issue, which is
but that doesn't help the other Defendants who are entitled
only to material that was seized.
          And so we -- we really have two reasons why this has
to be done this way, you know. One solution could be okay,
we've now looked at everything. We've taken the contraband
out, and we'll give you back everything else, and that happens
in the child pornography cases.
          In this case, there -- there presumably has been no
claim of contraband, but returning the item would -- would be
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beneficial for each Defendant, but it certainly wouldn't solve

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    the second problem.
              THE COURT: Right. I take it your point is that,
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    for example, Mr. Covelli is entitled to information seized
    from Ms. Valenzuela --
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              MR. NOLAN: Absolutely.
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              THE COURT:
                         -- upon which --
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              MR. NOLAN: Absolutely.
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              THE COURT: -- the Government is relying?
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              MR. NOLAN: Oh, yeah. And -- and we've cited on
    that, and there -- there's no doubt about that. I mean, this
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    is evidence that they may intend to use at trial that we need
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    to know about, we need to examine. It's -- it's Rule 16.
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    It's clear material.
              So -- and it's not up to the Defendants to make that
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    decision. It's up to the Government. In other words, the
    Defendants can't make that decision. They can't say "Well,
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    we'll give you in. We won't give you that."
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              I mean, that -- that -- my duty and my
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    responsibility -- I mean, the Government's duty can't be
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    transferred to the Defendants so --
              THE COURT: To say nothing of the cost.
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              MR. NOLAN: Well, that -- that is -- that is -- that
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    really goes to the crux, in my opinion, of the problem.
    that is, you know, eventually we're going to have -- we're
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    going to have debates about the costs of this kind of
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prosecution, this kind of discovery mechanism, this kind of problem associated with seizing items.

Now, where -- where should -- where should that burden be shown? Are -- are we going to end up with having the Defendants pay for it, at which point Congress is going to say "Well, what is this situation? You know, Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but look at how much it cost."

Well, no, it shouldn't be -- it shouldn't be attributed to the accused, the -- the cost. It should be the Government -- I mean, the -- the Justice Departments. It's all Justice Department, but it should be from the prosecution because it's a cost of prosecution. There's a cost associated with that type of seizure, using that type of warrant, you know.

And -- and we're just now getting into -- it's easy to say "Okay, let's go in and take the whole warrant -- I mean, take the whole hard drive. It's easy to say. It's convenient. We don't want to sit there," etcetera, but there's a price. And now, in this particular case, we're seeing that price.

And -- and I think that -- that unfortunately, you know, we're trying -- we are -- the Defendants are trying to make sure that that price isn't so great as to deprive our client of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which we need. And so it's just that a new procedure I think the Government

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    has to get used to doing in a case like this.
              THE COURT: So I take it that the Defendants are
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    asking this Court for an order compelling the Government to
    segregate that data and make it available to Mr. Aoki within a
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    certain number of days?
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              MR. NOLAN: That's exactly right. And just so it's
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    clear, I -- I want to be able to access and copy all relevant
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    materials seized by the Government pursuant to the searches of
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    each and every one of the hard drives that -- that -- in this
    case, and -- and -- and I want that because I'm entitled to
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         I do not want material that is irrelevant --
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              THE COURT: Irrelevant.
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              MR. NOLAN: -- maybe protected by privileges that
    the individual has. I -- I don't want irrelevant material.
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              THE COURT: Nor do you wish to have the burden or
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16
    expense of identifying irrelevant material as to your client?
              MR. NOLAN: And -- and -- and, of course, I can't
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    make that determination as to my own client, determining
    irrelevant material. You know, I -- I mean, might be able to
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    guess, but I'd hate -- I'd hate to choose this is irrelevant
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    and find out oh, they think it's relevant for some particular
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22
    reason.
              And -- and -- and I -- I -- I don't want anybody
23
    having my client's irrelevant material provided to them, nor
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    do I believe that -- that they should be entitled to it.
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and what they claim is relevant, then I can make further motions, beyond the scope of the warrant, you know. I can make all of those appropriate motions, but at the present time it's their duty to -- to segregate it out so that I can ask that Mr. Aoki be provided with the relevant portions of -- and material portions pursuant to Rule 16 of the items seized from the searches conducted in this case from all of the Codefendants in this case. He then can make it available to all counsel who are entitled to that information.

THE COURT: One -- one further question for you, Mr. Nolan. Is it accurate for me to understand as we sit here today, Mr. Aoki has copies of the data -- all of the data that has been seized on those devices?

MR. NOLAN: Number one, I believe Mr. Aoki, first of all, has data from two servers. He got that early on. Those servers, everything presumably is relevant or -- and we all have access, or are gaining access to that through the services of the -- of the different vendors.

As to the individual drives, I believe he's been sent individual drives of individual Defendants, and each Defendants' attorney has notified most of them -- I can't each and every one -- that they authorize -- that they do not authorize that any material from that computer drive be submitted -- be allowed to be obtained from any other

1 Defendant because they don't know, you know, what is and what is not -- belongs to them, etcetera. 2 3 So -- now, there is -- there is a -- there is a problem that we can address later, and that is I just got my 4 drive and it's in EnCase form, which is interesting because if 5 6 you look at the new guidelines that they're talking about AO -7 - you know, the problem is EnCase is really a Government 8 program. It's very, very difficult to buy. It's very, very 9 difficult to run. And when the Government takes the information from 10 the drive that -- that presumably I could put into a computer 11 12 and if I knew how to operate it, I can, you know, get the 13 information. They put it in EnCase for investigative purposes and for, you know, analysis, etcetera, and then they give it 14 15 to me. It's really -- it's really useless. So I mean, that's 16 a separate issue. THE COURT: Unless you, of course, take out an 17 18 EnCase license. MR. NOLAN: Unless I take out an EnCase license, and 19 last time -- every time I talk about that, you know, I see the 20 cost. I see the price, but -- and you also have to learn how 21 22 to use it. 23 The point being is is that they can't take the data,

change the nature of the data, and then give it back to me in

an unusual -- in a form that makes it near impossible for me

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to use, but that's a separate -- that's a separate kind of issue.
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So right now I have a hard drive. Mr. Aoki provided it to me, presumably of Mr. Covelli's computer, and that hard drive is in EnCase, and I now have to figure out how to learn that.

But I simply do not have the information from the other Defendants' hard drives, much of which must be relevant because the Government is, in fact, possessing it right now, and I need to know what that is and I need to be able to access it.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NOLAN: I -- I -- I think it -- I think it's -- it's -- I think it's pretty clear. I mean, I'm happy to kind of answer your questions, but the -- the case law seems to support this. Practical implications are that this should have happened.

And I have no way of figuring out how Mr. Aoki can - can devise a way to take my client's hard drive, separate
out that which is -- he thinks is relevant, and then give it
to Codefendants.

And I certainly wouldn't be agreeing to anything because I don't want to be part of that, you know. I want to be able to claim that it wasn't properly done too.

THE COURT: All right. I think I understand your

1 position, and I understand your interest. Let's hear from the Government on this. Mr. 2 3 Parrella or Mr. Chew, who is going to speak, please? MR. PARRELLA: I will, Your Honor. First of all, 4 let -- let's talk about the -- the issue of segregation. We 5 6 provided to Mr. Aoki images of every hard drive and computer 7 tower or laptop that was seized from these charged Defendants. 8 Okay. 9 THE COURT: Complete images? MR. PARRELLA: Yes. Total complete images. He had 10 -- he has them now. We had an agreement that the Defense 11 would segregate them in terms of sharing them with each other 12 13 because the Defense would know what information they 14 considered to be personal. 15 **THE COURT:** Is this agreement memorialized in any --16 MR. PARRELLA: No. No. This is -- you can see from the emails that were attached to our response that was the 17 operating theory. Individual Defendants were going to review 18 the -- the -- these hard drives. 19 That has now changed. They have reversed course on 20 21 that. I understand that providing information to each 22 Defendant is the Government's responsibility. We actually have done that. If the Court instructs us that we have to --23 so -- so we've actually completed it. I mean, we -- we have 24 25 turned over all the evidence seized from these Defendants to a

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    defense discovery repository.
              THE COURT: But you haven't complied with attachment
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    C; is that fair?
              MR. PARRELLA: Well -- well, we have.
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              THE COURT: How?
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              MR. PARRELLA: Attachment C allows us, if we find
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    evidence on a hard drive, to keep the entire hard drive in
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    order to establish the authenticity of the hard drive, the
9
    completeness of the evidence.
              THE COURT: Attachment C doesn't speak to
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    authenticity of completeness, does it? I didn't see those
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12
    words anywhere in there.
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              MR. PARRELLA: Our attachment C? Yes, that's --
    that's --
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              THE COURT: Where? Maybe I'm missing it. Where
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16
    does it say that?
              MR. PARRELLA: Well, I -- I -- I don't have it in
17
    front of me actually, Your Honor, so --
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MR. PARRELLA: And -- and that's where we're --
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    we're coming from. It's only in circumstances where there is
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    segregatable (sic) or it's on a separate hard drive that we
    would have to then return that hard drive.
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              THE COURT: So your view is that the segregation
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    obligation under the Protocol -- Protocol that was drafted, I
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1 believe, by the way, with the cooperation of your office --2 MR. PARRELLA: Yeah. I --3 THE COURT: -- obligates the Government to segregate information only on a drive-by drive basis and not a file or 4 directory-or-directory basis? 5 6 MR. PARRELLA: That -- that's -- that's correct, 7 because in order to -- in order to establish the -- the 8 authenticity of the drives and the authenticity of the 9 evidence, we need to keep the original item that was seized. Now, if there's nothing of evidence in a drive, then 10 we don't need to keep that and that can be returned. 11 12 THE COURT: So your view is if there was even a 13 single byte of relevant data on a multi-terabyte server or drive, you'd be entitled to keep the entire drive under this 14 15 Protocol and attachment based on your need to authenticate 16 that byte later at trial? MR. PARRELLA: That's right. That is exactly right. 17 I -- I -- this Protocol was created -- in fact, I wrote it and 18 submitted to Judge Spero, and so it was created by cooperation 19 with my office. 20 If you look at paragraph 9, it says, "For the 21 22 purposes of this search Protocol, the phrase to preserve 23 evidence is meant to encompass reasonable measures to ensure the integrity of information responsive to the warrant and the 24 25 methods used to locate the same."

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Now, I didn't -- I apologize for not using the same
language, but I didn't have it in front of me when -- when I
argued about authenticity, but that's what I was referring to.
          THE COURT: But of course, the only use of that
phrase is in paragraph 1, right? That's what it's defining,
isn't it?
         MR. PARRELLA: "To preserve evidence," I think, is
used in more than one paragraph, but in any case that is --
that is the -- the thrust of -- of -- of that paragraph.
          So if the Court is saying that we need to segregate
out personal data from the hard drives of each Defendant, I --
I can understand that -- that concept, and I understood it
from the Defense. That's why we offered to let them do it. I
-- I -- I understand it's --
          THE COURT: No, but the issue is who has the burden
of doing that, right?
         MR. PARRELLA: That's correct. And my --
          THE COURT: Hasn't Judge Jensen made it clear what
he thinks about this subject?
         MR. PARRELLA: Well, my only -- my only point in
bringing this up is that this is not an issue that's contained
within the Protocol.
          I think the -- I was not present during the argument
with Judge Jensen. I think it was -- from my review of the
transcript, it was brought up in a -- in a very brief manner.
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It wasn't completely fleshed out. There were other issues in terms of issues of return involved in that that were, quite frankly, not fleshed out.

And while we agree that if we have to segregate it, the Government can do that. It is possible for us to do. My only point is that the -- the -- the Protocol doesn't require that.

Imagine we only had charged one person. We would have provided the complete hard drive back to them, and we would be in total compliance with the Protocol. We wouldn't need to segregate that Protocol, if we had items of evidence contained within -- within the seized hard drives.

THE COURT: But -- but with all due respect, counsel, you didn't charge just one Defendant, right? You charged --

MR. PARRELLA: Right.

THE COURT: -- more than a dozen. So when you present this Protocol to colleagues in this district and elsewhere, it seems to me they are -- it's pretty clear they're relying upon the representation that there's going to be some effort -- reasonable effort, perhaps nothing more, nothing less -- to identify the stuff you're entitled to.

We all agree you're entitled to certain things under this warrant, but you got to give the other stuff back, or at a minimum you got to make it available in discovery so that

1 each Defendant can understand what evidence might be used 2 against them. 3 Isn't that pretty clear on the face of the Protocol? MR. PARRELLA: Well, we -- we did make it available. 4 We gave them copies of it. 5 6 THE COURT: But how are they to sift through all of 7 this data when it's clear there is at least some data -- I 8 suspect there's a lot of data that has nothing to do this case 9 on each one of those hard drives. MR. PARRELLA: Well, they would sift through it the 10 way you sift through anything. 11 In a wiretap case we have a thousand hours of 12 13 conversations. We may only have two hours that are relevant to the investigation, but we turn over a thousand hours of 14 15 investigation. And -- and they listen to the thousand hours, and they come to a conclusion as to what's relevant or not. 16 So your -- your -- your -- your view and 17 THE COURT: your office's view is that under Brady and all the Ninth 18 circuit precedent that fall from it, the cost of sifting 19 20 through all that data falls squarely on the Defendants? The Government bears no responsibility for that? 21 22 MR. PARRELLA: I -- I think it's actually a good

MR. PARRELLA: I -- I think it's actually a good point that you bring up, Your Honor, about Brady because there are many things -- if we segregate it out and we don't return to them the full and complete copy, later we could be accused

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-- if there's something that is found to be potentially *Giglio* material or potentially *Brady* material, we'd -- we'd be accused of violating *Brady*. And in -- in fact, what we're trying to do is follow a Court's order to segregate relevant material.

That's why we'd rather produce the whole thing.

That way it can't said that there's a *Brady* violation or a *Giglio* violation. Somewhere in a unrelated file there may be something that the individual later argues is *Brady*, but if we've turned it over, obviously, it's not *Brady* because it's been disclosed. So -- so that is an issue.

There's no way around it that in -- in this type of case, yes, Defense has to bear the burden of analyzing some of this stuff, and looking at some of it and seeing what's relevant and making a decision on their own.

THE COURT: Are you aware of any circuit or even district court that's ever addressed the issue of the Government's obligation to segregate data in a multi-Defendant case like this?

MR. PARRELLA: No, I'm not. And I -- I'm not aware of any decision that either says it's the Government's responsibility or it's the Defendants' responsibility or a third option, it's the Government's responsibility to turn everything over to everyone.

We actually originally entered into this, not from

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the standpoint of really discovery, but from a response to a
request by the Defense to remove personal identifying
information from each drive, and -- and that -- so that is why
we said, "Well, you would know that better than we do, so why
don't you do it? And that, obviously, has not worked now.
          So it -- it can be accomplished, and I do agree
we're probably in a better position to do that, the Government
is, and we can do that, but I -- I'm spending all this time
arguing for a couple of reasons.
          One, because I don't believe that the Protocol
itself mandates that. And number two, we're concerned that if
we do this that somehow we're -- we're going to get
boomeranged by trying to follow the Court's order, then later
we expose ourselves to a Brady charge or later we expose
ourselves to an incomplete discovery charge, if, for example,
the Defense raises a Defense that is responded to in some way
by information that wasn't turned over.
          So -- but with those caveats, I mean, I think we can
move forward. I -- I see where the Court is going.
                                                     I -- I --
I understand --
          THE COURT: I'm glad you do. I don't, but I have a
lot of questions around these issues. It seems to me that I'm
staring a bunch of search warrants that pretty clearly
suggested to the Magistrate Judge signing it that within a
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reasonable period of time -- 60 days is the default, some --

maybe it's another two months after that -- at some point the Defendants would have access to the stuff that say justify the warrant.

And the other stuff that's not -- that lies outside the scope of that warrant ought to be returned, ought to be shielded from view by other Defendants who have no right to it. It seems --

MR. PARRELLA: Well --

THE COURT: -- fairly straightforward.

MR. PARRELLA: -- a couple things. Number one, the information was made available to them. I mean, they -- each Defendant has access to their own hard drives that Mr. Aoki has. So if it's talking about, as Mr. Nolan was talking about, the information being separate from the actual machine, they have access to that.

So if they had financial information that they needed on that machine or, you know, tax information or personal information, they could go and access that. That is in compliance with the -- with the -- the Protocol, so -- so that is satisfied.

The Protocol specifically talks about if the Government is otherwise prevented by law to retain the items, and these are items that the Government alleges -- these machines, these hard drives, the originals, were utilized to plan the DDOS attack and effectuate the DDOS attack so --

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THE COURT: So on that issue, Mr. Parrella, is it
the Government's representation that each and every one of
these hundred-plus data storage units, hard drives, etcetera,
is an instrumentality?
          MR. PARRELLA: I believe so. As I stand here, I
don't have a list in front of me, but I believe that is the --
          THE COURT: Would you agree that if --
          MR. PARRELLA: (Inaudible - - due to simultaneous
colloquy.)
          THE COURT: -- one or more of these devices or -- or
storage units was not an instrumentality, there would be no
question you'd have to return them under the terms of the
Protocol itself?
         MR. PARRELLA: Well, it depends because if -- even
if it were not an instrumentality -- in other words, let's say
there was a separate hard drive that wasn't used to plan the
attacks, to communicate about the attacks or to effectuate the
attacks, but it was used to store logs of the attacks or to
store IRC chat about it, then that circumstance I would have
an issue that it is not returnable, even though it's not an
instrumentality. We would be able to retain that in order to
-- to establish the authenticity of the -- of that item.
However --
          THE COURT: Is -- is your authenticity argument
predicated on -- on a -- on a requirement that you have no
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other way to authenticate the data other than to complete a clean image and keep the original hardware?

Is that the standard I ought to be thinking about, or is it simply that it's more convenient for the Government to have the whole thing, and as long as it facilitates your opportunity to authenticate that's a sufficient basis?

MR. PARRELLA: Well, I -- I don't know that I would agree with either of those characterizations because it's not that there's no other way. You know, we -- we -- there are other ways.

THE COURT: Agents can come and agents can testify?

MR. PARRELLA: That's right.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PARRELLA: But to us, we should be entitled to prove our case in the way that we deem is best. This is the best evidence. We don't know now. We don't -- we certainly don't have any stipulations from the Defense to the authenticity or the completeness of both the actual evidence or of the search and the imaging procedures. In fact, Mr. Nolan seemed to indicate that they were going to make motions on that.

The best way to do that that I know of and I've only been -- and -- is to bring in, if it really gets down to it -- "This is the computer that we seized from Defendant X," and we can actually, you know, boot it up, put it on the screen. You

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1
    could see the logs right on that computer. That's the best
2
    way to do it.
3
              We shouldn't be restricted in that because, again,
    we're in a circumstance if we -- if we don't have that, then
4
    what prevents the Defense from saying, "Hey, guess what? They
5
6
    made a poor image. This image is corrupted."
              I guess if every Defendant stipulated, maybe we'd
7
8
    have a slightly different argument, but that's the landscape
9
    where we are right now.
              So I don't want to belabor this, but I have to check
10
    on Mr. Nolan's statement about whether the items are in EnCase
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12
    or not because I know we communicated -- and by "we," I mean
13
    the actual agents who were transferring it -- specifically
    with Mr. Aoki to make sure he could access these things in a
14
    way that was satisfactory to him. Just to be clear, we're not
15
16
    providing these hard drives to the Defense attorneys.
              THE COURT: There's a -- there's a CDA in between
17
18
    you.
              MR. PARRELLA: Right.
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              THE COURT: I understand.
              MR. PARRELLA: So I don't know what he's doing with
21
22
           I -- I do know there is an issue that we've been
23
    working with Mr. Aoki where I think, perhaps, the way Mr. Aoki
    is imaging these hard drives is causing some difficulty, but I
24
25
    -- I don't know that as I stand here for sure.
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1 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Parrella. MR. PARRELLA: So thank you. 2 3 THE COURT: Mr. Nolan or anyone else want to offer a brief rebuttal? 4 5 MR. LEEMING: Peter -- Your Honor, Peter Leeming for 6 Mr. Collins. 7 There's been a suggestion at the hearing before 8 Judge Jensen that resulted in the comments that have been 9 quoted were some kind of an afterthought. That's not true. There was -- I had conversations with Mr. Aoki. 10 This issue became apparent early that it was going to be 11 problem, and Judge Jensen made what I perceived to be an order 12 13 returning property and ordering the Government to segregate out relevant data. 14 15 There's really two issues that I think the 16 Government is bringing up here. One is the issue of authenticity. That is separate from identifying the data that 17 18 needs to be used to prosecute this conspiracy case. This isn't a situation where everybody is charged 19 individually. This is a situation where conceivably other 20 Defendants' information can be used against my client's, but 21 22 we've had privacy concerns raised by everybody that they don't want the entire contents of their hard drive shared with 23 everybody. So I mean, that's one. 24

Second is the volume of the data is tremendous.

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    It's huge.
              So I do think that it's incumbent upon the Defendant
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3
    to identify what it is they think is pertinent to this case.
    I think the authenticity issue is kind of a red herring. I
4
    think it can be addressed other ways, and that's my comment.
5
6
              THE COURT: All right.
7
              MR. LEEMING: Thank you.
8
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Leeming. Mr.
9
    Nolan.
              MR. NOLAN: Just very briefly. Counsel never did
10
    address your questions, in my opinion, on the issue of what
11
    about the multi-Defendant aspect of this.
12
              And I think it would be -- you know, you can look at
13
    it separately. If it was single Defendant, take the computer.
14
15
    I'd be in Court saying "Return to me the items." We'd go
16
    through that whole issue, and I'd say, "Well, wait a second.
    I need -- are you going to require me to suppress my
17
    photographs of family?"
18
              "No."
19
20
              "Are you going to -- am I going to have to come into
21
    court on that or don't you have a duty pursuant to your
22
    representation to the -- to the Magistrate?"
23
              I mean, these rules have only started to be -- be
    worked on in the last, you know, five or ten years. The idea
24
25
    of -- you know, and in terms of go in, take a huge amount of
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    material because it's easy. It's there. It's stored.
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              And then -- then sit on it basically, and then
3
    basically say "Well, we'll find what we want to find. We'll
    put it in -- we'll analyze it, but we don't have any duty to
4
    kind of go back and return what we shouldn't have taken in the
5
6
    first place, what we're not entitled to take in the first
7
    place. And the only reason we're entitled to take it is
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    because the Magistrate said as a practical matter we'll let
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    you take things you're not otherwise entitled to because
    you're going to return it, because you're going to do the due
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    diligence outside of that person's house rather than inside
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    that house."
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13
              That's the thing that seems to be lacking in the
14
    first argument.
15
              The second argument is we made no agreement
16
    regarding how these things would be handled. We basically
    told Mr. Aoki, most of us, I think all of us said, "Hey, I
17
    appreciate you getting our hard drive so we can take a look at
18
    it, but I'll be -- I don't want you to give this to somebody
19
    else." I said, "They're not entitled to it."
20
              And I don't want to disseminate something which may
21
22
    have been -- should maybe be suppressed because then I'm
23
    waiving that. You know, I -- I'm giving up that information.
    I can't do that and --
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THE COURT: Mr. Nolan, if the Government takes on

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    this burden, and it's a burden I believe under your argument
2
    they take on. I'm not saying how I see this yet.
3
              But if the Government were to take this burden on
    and make a mistake, right, and to, for example, allow access
4
    to your client's personal medical history or issues regarding,
5
6
    you know, family tax planning, things of that nature.
7
              MR. NOLAN:
                         Right.
8
              THE COURT:
                         What remedy would there be? What relief
9
    would the -- would -- would -- would you be entitled to under
    that situation where you're -- you are for -- you are telling
10
    the Government you want them to do this, and yet when they
11
    make a mistake who bears the burden of that mistake? That's
12
13
    what I'm trying to get at.
14
              MR. NOLAN: Yeah. I guess I don't look at it as I'm
15
    telling the Government what I want them to do. I'm telling
    the Government what I think they have to do.
16
17
              THE COURT: You're asserting --
              MR. NOLAN: Yeah, I'm asserting my right --
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19
              THE COURT: -- what you believe are your client's
    right.
20
              MR. NOLAN: -- to have them do that.
21
22
              THE COURT:
                         Yeah.
                                 Sure.
23
              MR. NOLAN:
                         And quite frankly, it is their duty to
    do well because they are taking material that is completely
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25
    irrelevant that the Magistrate Judge would not have allowed
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them to take that otherwise they would have had a special master so we could have claimed attorney-client privilege or some other kind of privilege on the materials, and it is their duty to do that. And -- and I think that the way -- I mean, who If -- if they're worried about something in the call they're making on a particular thing, you know, maybe protective orders are a way to -- to work on that so that -so we all have to sign kind of protective order so that the taint doesn't get dissipated unnecessarily, you know. So it doesn't become an automatic we can't stop the taint because we've released it to the -- the discovery master, something like that. I mean, those -- those possibilities might be able to be worked out. THE COURT: I take it that you're -- you're of the view that in urging or asserting this right that you believe your client has, you're not in any way waiving your further right to challenge the Government under Brady or otherwise down the road, right? MR. NOLAN: No. I am not waiving anything. And by

the way, we did not agree to anything that counsel said in terms of there was no agreement.

But no, I'm not waiving anything because I still am allowed to go in and move to suppress, move to -- move to suppress, move to -- move to make whatever motions are

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    appropriate, but I'm entitled to this. In other words, this
    is -- you know, it isn't -- it isn't like oh, if I get this
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    then I give something else. You know, I can't do that.
              THE COURT: All right.
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                         All right.
5
              MR. NOLAN:
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              THE COURT:
                         I think I understand your views.
7
              MR. NOLAN:
                         Thank you.
8
              THE COURT: All right.
9
              MR. NOLAN: All right.
              MR. COHEN: Judge, could I just add one very --
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              THE COURT: Sure, you can, Mr. Cohen. Go ahead.
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              MR. COHEN:
                          I just thought -- and I'm not suggesting
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    that the Government is being disingenuous with this, but I
    found it interesting that in comparison to a wiretap case
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    where they have thousands of hours of wires and they choose to
    use two calls.
16
              Well, there's an old foundation to this
17
    "minimization." The thousands of hours that they have should
18
    have and, indeed, must pass the minimization requirements in
19
    the first instance, leaving the Government with a thousand
20
    hours of relevant probative information, which allows them to
21
22
    pick five minutes.
              We don't have minimization here. We have the vacuum
23
    cleaner at work. They came in. They took everything. Some
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    of it's relevant, most of it is not. And it's a difficult
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    concept and it's evolving, but let's -- let's apply the
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    concept of minimization after the fact, and I think that's
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    what Judge Jensen was speaking to when he discussed the
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    matter.
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Motion to submit
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6
         I will issue an order very shortly on this subject after
7
    the hearing.
8
              Let's turn to some of the other issues that remain
9
    on our agenda. I'd next like to talk about the Pretrial
    Service proposal for modification of the -- what I'll call the
10
    inspection requirement.
11
              I believe this is captured Ms. Valenzuela's
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13
    objection at docket 191. I know there, again, were a number
    of joinders filed, but I'd like to hear from the Defendants,
14
15
    their arguments. Mr. Whelan, I suspect --
              MR. WHELAN: Your Honor, if I could suggest --
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17
              THE COURT: -- you're in a good position to address
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    this, so why don't you go ahead.
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              MR. WHELAN: -- we've tentatively agreed on kind of
    a tiering of how to deal with this -- this issue.
20
21
              THE COURT: All right.
22
              MR. WHELAN: And we tentatively agreed that I would
    go first on behalf of Mr. Cooper --
23
24
              THE COURT: All right.
25
              MR. WHELAN: -- because it was Mr. Cooper's bail
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    violation notice in December -- December 20, 2012 that got
    this issue rolling, if I may?
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              THE COURT: I'll just note for the record that I
3
    believe that Mr. Cooper's response is at docket 202. Why
4
    don't you go ahead.
5
6
              MR. WHELAN: And that is correct. And in essence,
7
    as I said in my moving papers, Mr. Cooper's issue essentially
8
    has been settled.
9
              Pretrial Services in Mobile, Alabama, the Southern
    District of Alabama has scanning software that they received
10
    from an USDOJ Law Enforcement Forensics Unit that's loaded
11
    with free software that -- and training is provided by US --
12
13
    this USDOJ Center.
              The Pretrial Services officer came to Mr. Cooper's
14
15
    house, inserted the thumb drive into his USB port, ran the
    scan. It took about an hour and a half. The first scan takes
16
    a long time.
17
              Mr. Robbins, the Pretrial Services officer, has
18
    educated me a little bit since the last court date. I've
19
    spoken with Mr. Carranza about that. And, you know, the next
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21
    scan that occurs is expected to take ten or 15 minutes because
22
    it only dates back to the first scan, which takes a long time.
23
              THE COURT: It's looking at the incremental change
    in the history?
24
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MR. WHELAN: Exactly.

1 THE COURT: Right. 2 MR. WHELAN: That initial scan retained a log of the 3 deleted files that Pretrial can look at, the Government can look at. My client on his computer also has a log of those. 4 He's sent it to me. I've offered it to the Government. 5 6 Pretrial in Alabama continues to have that software and continues to be able to monitor Mr. Cooper's compliance. 7 8 And so it's my understanding through discussions 9 with -- with Mr. Carranza that specifically as to Mr. Cooper and this issue, it's -- not an issue anymore. 10 The only additional thing that the Government and I 11 talked about is inserting into condition 4 of his Pretrial 12 13 release condition that he shall "not" then insert "intentionally delete internet history," etcetera. Having 14 15 said that, I think Mr. Cooper's issue is resolved. 16 The larger issue of whether other Pretrial Services offices, you know, should be --17 THE COURT: Not Mr. Cooper's problem, I understand. 18 19 MR. WHELAN: -- doing the same thing. I'm certainly, you know, presented that as an option, and -- but 20 I'm not -- yeah, I don't think that issue is involved. 21 22 Pretrial is still investigating it and trying out software, 23 and maybe Mr. Carranza can make --24 THE COURT: All right. Well --25 MR. WHELAN: Yeah, if we could --

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              THE COURT: I want to hear from Pretrial, of course
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3
              MR. WHELAN: Yeah.
              THE COURT: -- and the Government as well on this
4
    issue.
5
6
              Are there any -- as to Mr. Cooper and as to this --
7
    I'll call it suggestion that all of the districts rely upon
8
    this thumb drive with the scanning software -- does any -- do
9
    you wish to add any further -- does anybody else want -- wish
    to speak on that subject because I think I understand what
10
    you're saying pretty clearly?
11
              MR. WHELAN: I -- I think there is general --
12
13
    there's -- there's more issues on the global monitoring issue
    that other Defense lawyers may want to be heard on this
14
15
    scanning issue.
16
              I know there's -- there's unanimous opposition to
    inserting software on to the client's computer and having the
17
18
    Defendant pay a monthly fee to have a third party agency
    monitor his computer use. I -- I -- we will all object to
19
20
    that, and that's not necessary for my client because Pretrial
    already has the ability in Mobile to do what's necessary.
21
22
              I would ask the Court, after hearing from the
23
    Government and Pretrial, to deem Mr. Cooper's issue settled
    with the addition of the word "intentionally" into condition -
24
25
    - sentence one of condition 4.
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              THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Whelan.
2
    Leeming?
              MR. LEEMING: Yeah, just quickly, Your Honor.
3
    Leeming for Mr. Collins.
4
              The -- the problem that Mr. Collins faces, and is
5
6
    also a separate violation for him, is that he refused to sign
7
    a computer restriction and monitoring program participant
8
    agreement, which is used in the district where he lives.
9
    Apparently, they do not use anything else other than to
    install intrusive monitoring software on computers.
10
              THE COURT: Mr. Collins is in the Northern District
11
    of Ohio; is that correct?
12
13
              MR. LEEMING: I believe so.
              THE COURT: All right. Is that correct?
14
              MR. CARRANZA: Correct.
15
              MR. LEEMING: Yes. And so I have a copy of that
16
           It's a very intrusive agreement, and that is what he
17
    did not sign. I think there is a need for uniformity as --
18
19
              MR. CARRANZA: Oh, thank you, Your Honor.
20
              MR. LEEMING: -- best as we can do in these
    situations.
21
22
              THE COURT: Well, I'm sure that you would agree, Mr.
23
    Leeming, my challenge is on the one hand I'm being encouraged
    to consider uniformity. On the other hand, my Circuit and
24
25
    others have directed me to consider each individual
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Defendant's situation specifically, so there's a bit of a
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2
    tension between those two positions.
              MR. LEEMING: I understand that.
3
              THE COURT: So except, I suppose, if I were to raise
4
    to the bottom and adopt the one condition that any district
5
6
    could apply across the board, even if there were other
7
    districts that were able to take a more surgical approach to
8
    this. But I understand your view. That's -- you're -- you're
9
    speaking on behalf of Mr. Collins. All right.
              So what I've been handed then is a -- is an
10
    agreement, which is a requirement of the Northern District of
11
    Ohio?
12
13
              MR. LEEMING: That's my understanding, Your Honor,
14
    yes.
              THE COURT: All right. Do you wish to add anything
15
    further, Mr. Leeming?
16
              MR. LEEMING: No, except that we object to it and
17
    it's -- it would --
18
19
              THE COURT: I take that from your remarks, yeah.
20
              MR. LEEMING: I -- my view is when I saw this, it
    was inconsistent with the initial order that Your Honor made.
21
22
    It was inconsistent with other agreements that people were
    reaching with their individual Pretrial Services, and I don't
23
    think it's appropriate here.
24
25
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. Mr. Cohen?
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MR. COHEN: If I may? And I'm speaking, I think, on behalf of all of the Codefendants, as well as those who are not here today.

And I've had some discussions with the Government, and we think the Government's request -- heaven forbid I be accused of saying the Government is being reasonable -- but I think the Government's request that we provide Pretrial Services with an opportunity to examine and to explore whether this thumb drive attachment system will resolve this is reasonable.

I've spoken to the Pretrial people in Vegas, and although it's not a system that they use or have, when I explained to them or spoke to them on the basis of what co-counsel told me this system was about, they didn't seem to be terribly upset by it. It seems to be simple enough and it seems to be available.

So I think our position is with regard to this thumb drive system is we would respectfully request that Your Honor grant and join in with the Government's position -- Pretrial Service a reasonable opportunity to see if it will work and how so, see if there are any additional problems, and in the interim maintain the status quo ante.

And it seems to me with the insertion of "intentional," which we all agree on, in the interim that's something we can live with now on behalf of all of the

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    Defendants.
                 That sort of, I think, give all the sides that we
2
    need at this point.
              THE COURT: All right. Unless anyone else from the
3
    Defense wishes to address this issue, I'd like to hear from
4
    Mr. Parrella and, of course, Pretrial as well.
5
6
              Mr. Parrella, why don't you go first.
7
              MR. PARRELLA: So I wanted to bask in Mr. Cohen's --
8
              THE COURT: Reflective glow?
9
              MR. PARRELLA: -- acknowledgment of -- that I'm
    reasonable. But first of all, on the issue of inserting the
10
    word "intentional," we don't have any problem with that. That
11
12
13
              THE COURT: All right.
              MR. PARRELLA: That's fine by us.
14
              THE COURT: Well, since we're all in agreement on
15
16
    that one, let me just note on the record I'm going to grant
    that joint request, as I style it, and ask that a modification
17
    be drafted that I can sign, which adds the word "intentional"
18
    to the condition 1 in each of the release orders, so let's --
19
    let's go forward.
20
21
              MR. PARRELLA: Okay.
22
              MR. COHEN: It's condition 4.
23
              THE COURT: It's condition 4.
                                             Thank you.
              MR. PARRELLA: Thank you, Your Honor.
24
25
              THE COURT: I apologize.
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MR. PARRELLA: I -- I have two other comments, one
1
2
    on the technological fix suggested. And the Government --
3
    assuming that this thumb drive does what it is -- claims that
    it will do, which is to identify deletions and scan it,
4
    assuming that it does that in the manner in which it's
5
6
    advertised, we really don't have any objection to that, I
7
    think, as far as this district.
8
              Your Honor ordering other --
9
              THE COURT: There's an issue --
              MR. PARRELLA: -- Pretrial Services in --
10
              THE COURT: -- of my authority to do this.
11
                                                           Ι
    understand that.
12
              MR. PARRELLA: I think that, quite frankly, you can.
13
    I think that while there may be issues about exactly the
14
15
    manner in which certain conditions are effectuated by Pretrial
16
    Services, I think, in this particular case, if it's made
    extremely clear then, honestly, I think it's up to Pretrial in
17
    the other districts to abide by the order.
18
              And if they can't, then I guess we need to somehow
19
    address it if they're saying that they physically cannot.
20
    This doesn't seem to fit into the "cannot" category so --
21
22
              THE COURT: All right.
23
              MR. PARRELLA: -- I'll let you (Inaudible - - due to
    simultaneous colloquy.).
24
25
              THE COURT: All right. I think I understand the
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    Government too.
              Mr. Carranza, or -- would someone from Pretrial like
2
3
    to speak to this?
              MS. FARAHMAND: Your Honor, I would like to start by
4
    where we started with Mr. Whelan.
5
6
              One correction that I would like to make, in the --
7
    in the report by Officer Carranza dated January 31st, the
8
    second page, second paragraph on line 5, it should actually
9
    state "Mr. Archer," not "Mr. Whelan." So this --
10
              MR. WHELAN: Thank you.
              MS. FARAHMAND: So this -- this began with not Mr.
11
12
    Whelan's case, but a separate case for -- that Mr. Archer is
13
    (Inaudible - - due to simultaneous colloquy.)
14
              THE COURT: Could you remind me who Mr. Archer
15
    represents --
              MS. FARAHMAND: Yes.
16
17
              THE COURT: -- or perhaps Mr. Archer --
              MS. FARAHMAND: Ethan -- Ethan Miles.
18
19
              THE COURT: Thank you.
20
              MS. FARAHMAND: So that is how this all began, just
    to clarify that to the Court.
21
22
              THE COURT: Right. This is the District of Arizona?
              MS. FARAHMAND: Correct.
23
              THE COURT: Okay.
24
              MS. FARAHMAND: Additionally, with Mr. Whelan's
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    case, or Defendant Cooper, I have spoken to the Southern
    District of Alabama. I also want to clarify something with
2
3
    that as well.
              That district specifically as a whole does not use
4
    this program. The only person that does use this program is
5
6
    the officer that is monitoring this Defendant.
7
              It is not a protocol that the whole district uses,
8
    and he has actually -- the only reason why he uses it is
9
    because he brought it on. He was trained in this program on
    the state level, and then when he came to this district --
10
    that district (Inaudible - - due to simultaneous colloquy.)
11
              THE COURT: So he had particularly expertise --
12
              MS. FARAHMAND: Exactly.
13
              THE COURT: -- that allowed him to participate?
14
              MS. FARAHMAND: Yes.
15
              THE COURT: I understand. Okay.
16
              MS. FARAHMAND: So that's -- that's what I wanted to
17
18
    clarify. I will let Mr. Carranza speak to the thumb drive
    itself.
19
20
              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Carranza.
              MR. CARRANZA: Good morning, Your Honor.
21
22
              THE COURT: Good morning.
23
              MR. CARRANZA: I was able to obtain a copy of the
    thumb drive software that they spoke. I used it yesterday,
24
25
    played with it yesterday, and I found a significant glitch in
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1
    the system.
                 It's something we're still reviewing, but it --
2
    the glitch that I found is very significant and it would cause
3
    us concern.
              Our district -- our office is still going to look
4
    into the matter and see if it can be resolved or something I
5
6
    did wrong. I have not -- I have not been trained in the
7
             I watched a video.
    system.
8
              And I believe I provided some information to the
9
    Court yesterday, so it's something I cannot recommend that we
    will do or that's something we can implement in the future.
10
    We don't know enough about the system.
11
12
              THE COURT: Well, I -- I appreciate that. It seems
13
    to me that in light of your update, we ought to give Pretrial
    Services at least some time to complete its assessment.
14
15
    Perhaps it is operator error. I'm certainly guilty of that on
    more than one occasion. So I -- I -- it -- what I'd like to
16
    do is the following:
17
18
              Let's keep the status quo. I'd like to Pretrial
    another ten days to evaluate this. Do you think you need more
19
    time than that, Mr. Carranza?
20
              MR. CARRANZA: Well, Your Honor, I -- in order to be
21
22
    properly trained, I need to contact somebody from --
23
              THE COURT: All right.
24
              MR. CARRANZA: -- the agency that provides the
25
    service so we can get somebody to come out and actually --
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    other than just the basic video that -- it -- it might take
2
    longer.
3
              THE COURT: Why don't we set this for two weeks.
                                                                 Ιf
    you can report back to me that you're having difficulties
4
    meeting that deadline, I'll certainly consider that.
5
6
              MR. CARRANZA: We can --
7
              THE COURT: I'd like to just have something on the
8
    calendar to keep this proceeding.
9
              MR. CARRANZA: That -- that's fine, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Okay.
10
              MR. CARRANZA: But our -- our biggest concern is we
11
    -- meaning U.S. California Pretrial -- is looking into this
12
             There's 14 Defendants, 11 districts that supervise
13
    that Defendants that the Defendants live outside of our
14
15
    district, one of them being the Northern District of Ohio.
              Some of these districts -- I believe some of the
16
    districts already have policies and procedures in order -- I
17
18
    mean, who's monitoring software or how they can -- how do they
    implement this condition.
19
20
              Those conditions or that policy and procedure has
    been adopted by their district. It might have been approval
21
22
    with their court, approved by their chief. Our concern is
23
    we're going to be asking a district somewhere else outside of
    Northern District of California to follow this Protocol.
24
25
              There's four districts that don't have a policy or
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procedure or implement monitoring software. They don't use it at all. They -- all they do is do a manual search of the computer.

And for those districts, they will have to implement the policy and procedure and also obtain their court's approval or information from the court what their positions are.

So it might -- is that something that can be done fast. It's going to take some time to determine if this software would work and whether the 11 districts outside

Northern District of California are willing to use it.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. I'd -- I'd -- what

I'd ask in light of all that that is that, you know, over the

next two weeks you and your office do your best to investigate

whether this option is -- is feasible here in Northern

California and each of the other districts.

Candidly, if the report back from Pretrial is they have been unable to confirm or verify that certain districts are able to participate in this option, then I think we just have to take that at that point as a given and fashion either a new requirement or a new inspection protocol or something altogether different in order to address the issue.

But I would like to set this for two weeks out to give your office a fair and full opportunity to do the best you can to figure out what is possible.

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In the meantime, we'll keep things as they are. think that will preserve the situation for the Defense and Government under conditions that were originally agreed on by you all, I'll add, and we'll -- we'll see where we are in a couple weeks. Mr. Whelan, you wish to address this? MR. WHELAN: It sounds like the issue has to do with four districts, not 11. THE COURT: That may be. I --MR. WHELAN: If there are issues with other districts that have scanning capabilities, if some of the Defendant lawyers are not comfortable with it, I'm confident you'll hear about it --And, you know, we're not asking that every district supplant -- districts that already have a monitoring process supplant it with this thumb drive. I think the issue is that districts that don't have it. THE COURT: Right. MR. WHELAN: And whether the thumb drive is a reasonable, simpler way to do it, and that's being investigated. THE COURT: Well, let's -- let's see what we learn after a couple weeks. I think we'll keep the situation as it is for the time being, and it's my hope that we're able to move forward.

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From what I've heard, it doesn't strike me as a huge
technological barrier to overcome, but, you know, I don't
always see every obstacle out there in implementing a policy.
          So I'll look forward to hearing from you in a couple
weeks, Mr. Carranza.
         MR. CARRANZA: Thank you, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Thank you, sir. All right.
         Let's next turn to the issue raised by Mr. Kershaw.
It is Mr. Kershaw's motion?
         MR. FIGUEROA: Yes, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Regarding --
         MR. CHEW: Oh, Your Honor, just --
          THE COURT: Yes, sir.
         MR. CHEW: Real quickly, just -- just to clarify.
          THE COURT: Mr. Chew.
         MR. CHEW: So will there be another, I guess, status
conference before this Court in two weeks, or is it -- is the
two weeks the deadline for Mr. Carranza to report to the
Court? I just wanted to clarify.
          THE COURT: Well, I appreciate your clarifying that,
and in light of the logistics required to have you all appear,
I am in my mind thinking of a report from Mr. Carranza in --
         MR. CHEW: Okay.
          THE COURT: -- two weeks, and then we'll see if we
need to reconvene.
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MR. CHEW: Yeah, because I -- I thought --
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2
              UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible - - due to
3
    simultaneous colloquy.)
              MR. CHEW: -- that would make sense -- it would make
4
    sense, Your Honor, because --
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6
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you for clarifying
7
    that, Mr. Chew. All right.
8
              So just -- again, just so my record is clear here,
9
    I'm referring to Mr. Kershaw's motion at docket 174. Let's
    talk about Twitter and IRC. Mr. Figueroa, go ahead.
10
              MR. FIGUEROA: Yes, Your Honor. We believe that the
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12
    proper analysis is strict scrutiny analysis. It seems that
13
    the People are arguing that the conditions are reasonable, and
    that's a rational basis approach, and that's wholly
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15
    inappropriate when a federal court is considering First
    Amendment issues.
16
              So we ask the Court to employ a strict scrutiny
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    analysis and hold the Government to its burden of first
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    establishing a compelling governmental and, second, showing
19
    it's narrowly tailored.
20
              THE COURT: And what basis are you invoking the
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22
    strict scrutiny standard? I don't see, for example, content
23
    element to this restriction. Is there some other basis you're
24
    relying upon?
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              MR. FIGUEROA: Yes, Your Honor. It's core political
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    discourse. We did submit some proposed tweets from Mr.
    Kershaw where he wants to engage in political discourse. The
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3
    Chief Executive Barack Obama only communicates his Twitter
    through Twitter, and there's no other way to access it.
4
              I guess the prosecution's position is that maybe Mr.
5
6
    Kershaw can glean secondhand from news reports the President's
7
    tweets, but that is not an adequate substitute.
8
              So we believe that strict scrutiny is required
9
    because we're talking about political discourse, the core of
    the First Amendment.
10
              THE COURT: Do you have any thoughts, counsel, about
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    how I might narrowly craft or tailor this restriction? For
12
13
    example, would you suggest your client be permitted to access
    tweets using certain hash tags but not others?
14
15
              Is there some way we can focus on what you're
16
    entitled to without impinging upon the Government's legitimate
    concerns here?
17
              MR. FIGUEROA: Yeah, that's a possibility. To allow
18
    him to certainly access the tweets issued by the Presidential
19
20
    candidates in the Presidential contest, but I don't know if
    the hash tags --
21
22
              THE COURT: I'm just --
23
              MR. FIGUEROA: My understanding.
              THE COURT: -- brainstorming out loud here.
24
25
              MR. FIGUEROA: Yeah.
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              THE COURT: It seems to me what you're saying is
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    whatever way we cut this your position and, I take it from the
3
    joinder, a number of the Defendants' position is an absolute
    blanket ban is not appropriate and you'd like to see some
4
    opportunity for participation?
5
              MR. FIGUEROA: Yes, Your Honor. We believe a
6
    categorical -- categorical prohibition is inappropriate.
7
8
              I tried to negotiate with the Government to come up
9
    with some sort of compromise where he could have narrowly
    tailored conditions that would still allow Mr. Kershaw to --
10
              THE COURT: I take --
11
              MR. FIGUEROA: -- engage in political discourse.
12
13
              THE COURT: -- it those discussions we're fruitful?
14
              MR. FIGUEROA: They were not.
              THE COURT: All right. All right. From the
15
16
    Government, who wants to speak to this, Mr. Chew?
17
              Thank you, Mr. Figueroa.
              MR. CHEW: Well, thank you, Your Honor. I think a
18
    couple things need to be considered.
19
20
              First of all, the Court should note that these are
    not conditions that the Government unilaterally imposed upon
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22
    the Defendants. These are conditions that the Defendants
23
    negotiated, you know, with -- with the Government and agreed
    to so --
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25
              THE COURT: And with the Court essentially.
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MR. CHEW: And -- and --1 2 THE COURT: -- right? MR. CHEW: Yes. The -- the Defendants agreed --3 most Defendants, except for Mr. Kershaw, agreed twice, both on 4 the record in court and in the stipulations. 5 6 Second, we -- the Government doesn't believe that 7 the current restrictions against Twitter and the IRC violate 8 or infringe upon the First Amendment. 9 They don't restrict the Defendants' ability to express his views on -- on the political discourse. They 10 don't -- they don't endorse or sensor a particular point of 11 view. They're content -- they're content neutral, so it's the 12 13 Government's position is strict scrutiny is not appropriate in -- in -- in -- in this case. 14 15 The Government -- the Defendants -- I'm sorry, 16 strict scrutiny is usually applied to laws, ordnances, regulations and policies. The Government is unaware of any 17 18 case where strict scrutiny is applied to a -- to a term of 19 pretrial release. 20 Even -- even if strict scrutiny did apply, the -the restrictions are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 21 22 Government interest. The Government did not seek to -- to 23 limit any use of computers. The Government did not seek to -to limit internet use -- you know, to ban internet use if you 24 25 ban the use of computers. In that sense, they are narrowly

tailored.

The Defendant has multiple avenues to -- to express his political opinion or, you know, to -- to communicate with others. He's got chat rooms. He's political blogs. He's got email. There are a number of viable alternatives.

And as for the compelling Government interest, the Anonymous Group communicates through IRC and through Twitter.

The Anonymous Group sends out its information, coordinates its plans through -- you know, through -- through -- through those means.

If -- if the Court were to cut off the Defendants from IRC and Twitter, the Courts would be cutting off -- the Courts would be cutting off the Defendants from their flow of information and communication from Anonymous, and that's what the Government is seeking. That is the compelling Government interest.

Now, if the -- if the Court were to adopt the

Defendants' point -- the Defendants' kind of point of view as
to the broadness of the constitutional rights versus the

court's power, the Court would be negating a large part of its
own power because under the Defendants' interpretation, the

Court wouldn't be able to fashion, for example, a condition

limiting who the -- who the Defendant would associate with

because that would, you know, infringe upon their First

Amendment right of --

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THE COURT: Right. Presumably, for example, if I have a restriction and a release order that says the Defendant can't talk to a Codefendant that would, by definition, restrict their ability to talk about the President, other candidates for the office and so forth, and yet we do that all the time. MR. CHEW: Yes. THE COURT: Right? MR. CHEW: That's -- that's correct, Your Honor. And so the Government believes that these -- these prohibitions against the use of Twitter and the IRC are appropriate restrictions. THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Chew. Any -- any rebuttal, Mr. Figueroa? MR. FIGUEROA: Yes, Your Honor. The Government proffers no particularized evidence against Mr. Kershaw showing that he personally has misused or improperly used either Twitter or IRC, yet the Government wants to ban him categorically from those modes of expression. There's no concrete or particularized evidence against Mr. Kershaw. That's one of the factors that's enumerated in 3142(g)(2). It's the weight of the evidence against the person. Instead the Government brings up this nebulous group of unknown others, the Anonymous Group, and says the Anonymous Group does this and, therefore, Mr. Kershaw must be banned from IRC and Twitter, but there's no evidence against Mr. Kershaw.

And without a proffer that's concrete as to Mr.

Kershaw, the weight to -- of the evidence against Mr. Kershaw is minimal.

THE COURT: So Mr. Figueroa, you -- you present a number of compelling arguments. It would seem to me, though, that all of these arguments could have been, and perhaps were, presented earlier.

In order to reconsider or modify conditions of release there has to be something new, would you agree, for the Court to consider or to deliberate on? What's new in all of this? What's changed between when I first imposed these conditions and today?

MR. FIGUEROA: For Mr. Kershaw, he accepted the conditions initially so that he could have access to a computer, but we did notify the Government that we reserved the right to dispute the First Amendment issues, and we did bring it up in due course.

We have never forfeited that argument. We have always objected to the First Amendment issue, but we did agree initially so that we could get a better grasp on the evidence to see if -- if the Government did have concrete evidence of --

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              THE COURT: Your point is you haven't seen anything
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    yet?
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              MR. FIGUEROA: That's right.
              THE COURT: All right. I think I understand your
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    position.
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              MR. CHEW: Well, Your Honor, if the --
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              THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Chew.
7
8
              MR. CHEW: -- Defense would like, you know, evidence
9
    concerning Mr. Kershaw's use of IRC, they only have to refer
    to the search warrant of his premises where -- I'm sorry, not
10
    the search warrant. They only have to report to -- I'm sorry.
11
              They only have to refer to certain reports where Mr.
12
13
    Kershaw did provide IRC logs from his computer, I think, that
    were related to -- to -- to the -- to Anonymous.
14
              THE COURT: All right.
15
              MR. FIGUEROA: But, Your Honor, where -- where's the
16
    evidence about Twitter? You know, there's no -- no -- no
17
    mention of Twitter whatsoever.
18
              THE COURT: All right. I think I understand your
19
    views.
20
              Mr. Nolan, do you wish to speak on behalf of your
21
22
    clients?
              MR. NOLAN: Only -- only to -- only to add that --
23
    that for -- for those of us that are a little older, we didn't
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25
    have -- I didn't have any idea how important Twitter was.
                                                                I'm
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    going to have to learn how to use Twitter, and when I agreed
    to it I certainly didn't have an appreciation for Twitter.
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3
    Now, I do because it seems like I'm going to have to learn it.
              So the agreements made, you know, at the time
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    without being well thought out, and certainly the Twitter one,
5
6
    at least -- you know, I'll claim ineffective assistance of
7
    counsel, if I'd thought it out, thought well, maybe now I have
8
    to learn Twitter. So you know, we think these things
9
    through --
              MR. CHEW: Could we get that --
10
              MR. NOLAN: Yeah.
11
              MR. CHEW: I'd like that transcript, actually.
12
              MR. NOLAN: Exactly. Exactly. So -- so I mean,
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    that -- that is the change.
14
              THE COURT: No. I understand.
15
              MR. NOLAN: You know, as we get together, people
16
    coming from all over, and -- and -- and I just -- I guess I
17
18
    may have to learn Twitter.
19
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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              UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, if I may because
    I took the lead of the Defendants when we negotiated.
21
22
              You know, the Government and the Defense spent a lot
    of time and effort, weeks, reaching what we believed to be a
23
    reasonable resolution. I'd be the first to admit that in
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25
    dealing with it, as with my colleague, slipped right through
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it.

We now know that even things have proven workable for six months that there's now been an application to rewrite it by Pretrial Services. And I think very much the same position that now we've had an opportunity to see this, and counsel have had an opportunity to reflect upon and start looking at the evidence, so they'd like to be in the same position to ask the Court to consider it.

To the extent that people are now being forced with a waiver -- it was a waiver on my part initially, and again, it was done with the best of intention to facilitate this and move this along.

And just as there are claims that certain things are not working in certain respects and the Court is revisiting it -- revisiting it, so, too, I -- I respectfully suggest the same standard should apply in terms of those.

THE COURT: All right. I understand your view. All right. That -- that matter is submitted. I will, again, rule shortly.

Let's turn to -- unless I'm overlooking something, I believe we need to address some specific issues for particular Defendants and their bail conditions.

I'm referring to Mr. Collins, and I'm looking at you, Mr. Leeming.

MR. LEEMING: I see that, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: I understand Mr. Collins is on by
telephone, if that -- Mr. Collins, are you there, sir?
         DEFENDANT COLLINS: Yes, sir.
         THE COURT: All right. Welcome.
         Mr. Leeming, why don't you speak to the violations
that have been alleged.
         MR. LEEMING: Yes.
                             There's -- there's two
violations, Your Honor. The second one, I think, is the
easiest, which is, "Furthermore, Mr. Collins is refusing to
provide information about his computer, which has prevented
the supervising office from inspecting his computer as
required."
         My understanding is what he did was refuse to sign
the form, which we submitted to you. It's different than what
you ordered. I addressed that earlier. If you have any more
questions about that --
          THE COURT: No. I think I understand your view on
that.
         MR. LEEMING: Okay. Fine. The other is that he has
tested positive for cocaine, from what I understand is twice
that has been verified and a third time, which apparently was
yesterday, and so this is -- this was verified by gas
chromatograph.
          I have spoken to him at length about this. It is an
unfortunate situation that he is in. He participated just
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briefly in a couple of different double blind treatment options.

I have a letter from his physician, which I would submit to the Court. I chose not to efile it. The Government and Pretrial service have seen it. It is summarizing his medical condition briefly at the moment.

There was a period where he had to take no medications to get ready for a new treatment course, and during that time he took various less than clinically approved medications. And it is -- I think he's willing to admit that -- and Dennis, please feel free to correct me if I'm wrong in this -- that in ingesting those unapproved medications he ended up testing positive for cocaine.

With that, I think he is willing to agree that he violated the terms of his release by doing so, and that he would participate in some kind of treatment or counseling, as necessary, to address that.

There are a couple of concerns we have about that.

One is that he does not drive. He has some mobility issues.

He can get rides. He obviously did today.

And so that is our position, and  $I\ --$  and the intended admission, or at least the vague text of it for this morning.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Leeming.

Mr. Carranza, I have your memo, but is there

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    anything you wish to add?
              MR. CARRANZA: Just the positive drug test from --
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3
    presumptive positive drug test from last night that we were
    informed of this morning.
4
              And also, we received information from Ohio that Mr.
5
6
    Collins informed that he used some medication that did not --
7
    he was not authorized to use, and it might have been the
8
    reason he tested positive for cocaine last night.
9
              I spoke with the officers in Ohio. They're willing
    to work with Mr. Collins. But he's already been to counseling
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    once, and was basically terminated for noncompliance or not
11
    willing to participate in -- with the services.
12
13
              I just wanted to make sure that if Mr. Collins is
    given the opportunity that he takes advantage of that
14
15
    opportunity and he fully complies with the program, and any
    further violations could result in him coming back to this
16
    district to address further violations.
17
              THE COURT: All right. I -- I take it from Mr. --
18
    thank you, Mr. Carranza.
19
20
              I take it from Mr. Leeming's remarks that, at least
21
    at this point in time, Mr. Collins is expressing a willingness
22
    to participate in drug counseling as ordered by the Court; is
23
    that right, Mr. Leeming?
24
              MR. LEEMING: Is that right, Mr. Collins?
25
              DEFENDANT COLLINS:
                                  Yes.
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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Collins, I'm going to
    modify your conditions of release to require that you
    participate in drug counseling in light of this violation.
              Sir, I'm going to be very direct and blunt with you.
    If you blow this one, you're going to be brought back to this
    district and we're going to address a more serious and
7
    substantial modification of your release, indeed, your release
8
    at all.
              I just want to be very clear with you, sir, that
    when this Court issues conditions upon which you are to be
    released from custody, those conditions are to be complied
11
    with to the letter. And it troubles me, to say the least,
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13
    that I've learned that you have not been able to do that.
              I'm going to give you this opportunity. As Mr.
14
    Carranza just indicated, it is in your interest to take
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    advantage of it. If I'm informed that you have not, as I
    said, there will be consequences, and you need to that. Do
17
    you understand that, sir?
18
              DEFENDANT COLLINS: Yes, sir, I do. And may I --
19
20
              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Leeming, is there
    anything further on this?
21
22
              MR. LEEMING: No, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: All right. Let's consider that
23
    addressed. Thank you, Mr. Carranza.
              MR. CARRANZA: Thank you, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: All right. Well, counsel -- Mr.
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2
    Figueroa?
              MR. FIGUEROA: Your Honor, I'd like to address the
3
    issue of urinalysis.
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              THE COURT: I was just going to turn to that, so why
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    don't you -- why don't you begin.
              MR. FIGUEROA: Thank you, Your Honor. We request
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8
    that the condition requiring analysis be terminated. We don't
9
    believe it's required. There's no proof that Mr. Kershaw uses
    any illegal or drugs of any kind other than alcohol.
10
              THE COURT: All right. So I take it your basis for
11
    requesting this modification is Mr. Kershaw's sterling record
12
    to date on this -- under this Protocol, and the -- the burden
13
    that's associated with complying with this test regime going
14
    forward; is that --
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              MR. FIGUEROA: Yes. He's tested clean with -- for
16
    drugs. And we spoke with Pretrial Services after the last
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18
    court date, and it appears that there may not be a problem
    with this request.
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20
              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Carranza, do you want to
    address this one?
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              MR. CARRANZA: Yes, Your Honor. I spoke with the
    supervising officer for Mr. Kershaw that is the district --
23
    District of Utah, and he informed that all tests had been
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    negative.
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The way they do alcohol testing is via urine
samples. So although he won't be -- if the Court is in
agreement -- he won't be testing for drugs, but he still is
required to submit to urine samples for alcohol.
          THE COURT: All right. It would seem, Mr. Figueroa,
that that would -- that would still impose a burden on Mr. --
on Mr. Kershaw, correct?
         MR. FIGUEROA: Yes, Your Honor. And we're asking
that the alcohol condition be modified to order him to refrain
from excessive use of alcohol, but not to prohibit him from
using alcohol whatsoever. He wants to be able to drink a
couple beers during a football game.
         MR. CARRANZA: Well, Your Honor --
         THE COURT: Yes.
         MR. CARRANZA: -- there's some issues with that.
         UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The season is over.
         UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Basketball.
          THE COURT: You took my line, counsel. Go ahead,
Mr. Carranza.
         UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sorry about that, Judge.
I'll refrain from gratuitous comments again.
          THE COURT: Go ahead, sir.
         MR. CARRANZA: An officer conducted a home visit.
He found a substantial amount of alcohol in the residence.
Mr. Kershaw admitted that he had gone through counseling, and
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    on the way home he had a couple beers on the road and there
    was some alcohol in the vehicle. The officer made him throw
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    it out.
              So at this time we would oppose that modification
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    be --
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6
              THE COURT: Eliminated completely?
              MR. CARRANZA: -- eliminated.
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8
              THE COURT: Yeah.
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              MR. CARRANZA: I think there should be no alcohol at
    all.
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              THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Figueroa?
11
              MR. FIGUEROA: Submitted.
12
              THE COURT: All right. Well, I am -- based on the
13
    information I have received, I'm -- I'm not persuaded that a
14
    modification is warranted at this time. I am concerned about
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    evidence of excessive use.
16
              However, I think a prohibition on excessive use
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    alone would be insufficient to assure compliance, and so I
    will keep the urinalysis requirement as it stands.
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              Counsel, have I missed anything on our agenda?
              MR. MILLER: Pardon me, Your Honor?
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22
              THE COURT: Yes, sir.
23
              MR. MILLER: My name is Mark Miller.
                                                     I'm the
    aftercare treatment specialist in Northern Ohio. I'm with Mr.
24
25
    Collins here.
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THE COURT: Well, sir. Go ahead. 1 2 MR. MILLER: I apologize for interrupting, but Mr. 3 Collins had some issue with the treatment agency that we are referring him to for services, which we --4 5 THE COURT: Go ahead, sir. I'm listening. 6 MR. MILLER: Okay. Which we intend to counseling 7 there. However, he made -- to wanting to find his own 8 counseling or counseling services, so I just wanted to address 9 that before we leave this phone conference. THE COURT: All right. Well, you -- you -- you were 10 breaking a little bit, sir, so I may have missed a couple of 11 12 the things you were saying. 13 Is the issue the where Mr. Collins is receiving his 14 treatment or --MR. MILLER: Well, he has indicated that -- that he 15 16 has a problem with where he is at least going to receive the treatment. That's our contract agency that we use in this 17 district that provides services for almost all of our Pretrial 18 and probation either offenders and Defendants. 19 20 He made some vague reference to he and his attorney 21 working out something to find another counselor that would be 22 more suitable for him, but our intention here would be to 23 continue him with that treatment agency, unless or until we

found some other counselor that we found to be suitable.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I have his attorney

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    standing at the podium. So Mr. Leeming, do you want to speak
    to this?
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              MR. LEEMING: Of course I'm not familiar with the
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    specific program in Ohio that's the subject of this. I have
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    heard of some friction. My suggestion is this:
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              We've got two weeks for Pretrial to look into some
7
    other things. Perhaps I could work with the Federal Defenders
8
    Office and Pretrial Services back in Ohio and explore
9
    different options and report to the Court and to Pretrial, and
    we can -- I think we can solve this problem.
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              THE COURT: All right. I think that's a reasonable
11
    approach. We'll keep things as they stand over the next two
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13
    weeks. At the next conference, whenever that may be -- I want
    just to be clear. We are not setting a conference for two
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    weeks from today. I'm simply going to receive a report from
    Mr. Carranza.
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              MR. LEEMING: And is it acceptable for me to send a
17
    letter to you or an email to you -- to your clerk, Your Honor?
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19
              THE COURT: Absolutely.
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              MR. LEEMING: Very good.
              THE COURT: All right. Sir, does that address your
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22
    issue for the time being? I'm not hearing anyone in the
23
    Northern District on the phone.
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              MR. LEEMING: I take it there's no objection.
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              THE COURT: All right. On that note, we will stand
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    in recess. Thank you, counsel.
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               MR. LEEMING: Thank you.
                  (Proceedings adjourned at 11:22 a.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER I certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript, to the best of my ability, of the above pages of the official electronic sound recording provided to me by the U. S. District Court, Northern District of California, of the proceedings taken on the date and time previously stated in the above matter. I further certify that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken; and, further, that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. Stay Negres 9/18/2012 Signature of Transcriber Date